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MYTHS ABOUT TIlE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
1) False prophets and bad historians
"Wealthy we do not think (Japan) will
ever become; the advantages conferred by
Nature, with the exception of the climate,
and the love of indolence and pleasure of the
people themselves forbid it. The Japanese
are a happy race and being content with
little are not likely to achieve much."1-)
*Misprophecies like this are often based on a failure to
understand the history of the societies concerned. The
first myth to examine, therefore, is that which holds
that "the developing countries are in the process of
being rescued from decades, possibly centuries of
stagnation." Professor A. Youngson2) comments:
This proposition is one of the classic examples of economistts
myopia. Even the slightest acquaintance with the economic
history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries suffices to
show that tea, coffee, sugar, tin, copper, rubber, mahogany,
silk, rice and opium (to name only the most obvious commodities,
and to say nothing of oil) were traded in vastly increased
volume over a long period. And it is manifestly not the case
that these commodities came from the areas of recent (Anglo-Saxon)
settlement.
Perhaps economists do not read economic history; or, which
is equally likely, perhaps they do not understand it. Nevertheless,
they are known to visit developing countries. It might be supposed
that they would observe, in a large number of these countries,
rai 1-way lines, irrigation canals, harbours, docks, warehouses,
government offices, paper money, and a general awareness of economic
opportunities which it would be difficult to suppose were the
result of activity extending back no further than 1950. But either
they do not observe these things, or they fail to draw the obvious
conclusion. Were they able to extend their fièld of vision they
might notice such relics of the construction industry as the opera
house at Manaos of the Shwedegon Pagoda. But in these perspect-
ives they show virtually no interest.
Citatíon from The Japan Gazette, 1882, in G.C. Allen, A Short
Economic History of Modern Japan, p. 46. The Editor is
indebted to Dr. Richard Jolly for pointing out this quotation.
2Professor of Economics, University of Edinburgh
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What then is their point of view? It is not altogether easy
to be sure. As long as it was confidently maintained that
industrialisation (meaning the spread of modern factory industry)
was economic development, then it was tautological to say that
the develop±ngcointries had not developed, i.e. were stagnant.
Now, economists seem less sure that industrialisation and economic
development are the same. They fall back, however, on the
proposition that economic development means a growth of per capita
income. For the decades before 1950 it is difficult to provie
anything about per capita incomes, although it is not absurd to
maintain that in most developing countries they altered slowly if
at all.
But to define stagnation in either of these ways is a misuse
of language. That output and population rose rapidly in many poor
countries from, say, 1850 is beyond question. There was economic
growth before 1850, too. Not only so, there is ample evidence that
methods of organisation were changed appropriately. In many cases
the capacity f dr organisation reached a very high level. Anyone
contemplating the domes and palaces of Kyoto or 1sf ahan must
realise that they are the product of, among other things, a high
level of economic organisation in general and of fiscal policy in
particular.
If a country's past is, in a legitimate sense, one of stagna-s
tion, then that country has no history. But the developing countries
have an ample history of reorganisation, of struggle for power, of
advance and retreat. If they appear to have no economic history,
it is mostly because it has yet to be written. In any case, rise
in per capita income was not their aim. They may now accept that
as an objective. But we are not likely to help them very effect-
ively to achieve it, if we assume that past acceptance of other
objectives has meant that significant changes never took place
before.
2) The Burden of Ineua1ity
*Even when people admit that developing countries "have a
history", they often conclude that the present pattern of
international inequality shows a lack of some resource.
For otherwise these countries would have gone through the
classic stages of growth like European and American
nations. But may it not be the very presence of these
'model' industrial states which is hamperinß those who
come behind? To invert a well-known literary exchange
(Scott Fitzgerald and Hemingway), the retort to the
remark, "The poor are different from u&', might be,
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"Yes, they are poorer". Paul Streeten suggests that,
indeed, "he who weeps last weeps worst".
It is a widespread myth that international inequality
reflects, but does not cause, differences in economic prospects
and performance. Once this myth is planted, other myths sprout
from it, such as the myth that each society goes through a
number of comparable stages and that what was true of one country
at a time when it did not coexist with much richer countries must
also be true of another country which attempts to develop in a
world of considerable international inequality.
In fact, coexistence of rich and poor alters crucially the
development prospects of the poor. Some fairly obvious forces
make for easier development. But the net balance of forces
probably raises obstacles to development for the late-comer. This
is not the result of exploitation (though both exploitation and
genuine assistance are facts of history) but the result of the
impact of rich on poor. Among the main difficulties raised for
the poor by coexistence with the rich are the introduction of a
modern death rate into societies with primitive birth ratesl the
transfer of ill-adapted and detrimental advanced technologies
and social institutions (from parliamentary democracy to trade
unions); the pull in the salary structure exercised by an
international market in scarce skills; the attraction of
capital to the industrial centres; the development of synthetic
substitutes for many primary products exported by poor countries,
national welfare policies of democratic industrial states, such
as protection of agriculture and labour-intensive industries,
restrictions on immigration of unskilled labour and restrictions
on the international flow of capital; and the damaging impact
of irrelevant economic doctrines, which generate the myth of
the irrelevance of inequality.
3) The Imperative of Inequality
*Inequality between nations may have bad effects
on the development of poor countries. But at
least within such countries inéquality of some
kind is obviously one of the costs of development,
Warden of Queen Elizabeth House and Director
of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies,
University of Oxford.
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particularly at an early stage. Is it, however,
so obvious? Keith Griffin1) asks: are equality
and development incompatible?
The conventional answer to this question is "yes". In a
remarkable pontifical statement before a Pakistani audience,
Professor Harry Johnson, the high priest of neo-classical
economics, solemnly declared that "the remedies for the main
fault which can be found with the use of the market mechanism,
its undesirable social effects, are luxuries which underdeveloped
countries cannot afford to indulge in if they are really serious
about attaining a high rate of development. In particular, there
is likely to be a conflict between rapid growth and an equitable
distribution of income; and a poor country anxious to develop
would probably be well advised not to worry too much about the
distribution of income." 2) (Alas, the hapless Pakistanis
believed him.)
The attitudes reflected in Professor Johnson's statement -
a bias in favour of private enterprise, the market mechanism
and growth and antagonism toward socialism, planning and
equality - merit an extended analysis. All that can be done
here, however, is consider whether the conflict he poses exists.
I shall argue that it does not: Professor Johnson has merely
resurrected an ancient dogma in an attempt to defend the status
The incompatibility of equality and development depends
upon the assumption that a more equal distribution of income
would lead to lower savings, fewer incentives, and slower growth.
There is little evidence that one can find to support this view;
indeed, the opposite could well be true.
If one compares the percentage of total income accruing
to the top ten percent of income earners with the net domestic
savings ratio one finds no positive association between inequality
and thriftiness. For example, the upper ten per cent of income
1Fe1low of Magdalen College, Oxford.
2) ,, ..
H.G. Johnson, Planning and the Market in Economic
Development," Money, Trade and Economic Growth, p. 153.
The ssay was originally published in the Pakistan
Economic Journal, VIII, no. 2, June 1958.
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éarners in Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, and India receive,
respectively, 47-49%, 48% 44% and 33-37% of total income, while
the savings ratios in the same countries are about 3%, 6%, 4%
and 10% respectively. India, the poorest and least inegalitarian
of the four countries, has the highest savings ratio.
Similarly, if one examines individual countries it is not
obvious that the rich save more than the poor. In Pakistan a
pioneering study, no doubt using rather unreliable data,
suggests that gross personal savings as a percent of gross
personal income before taxes are 10.9% in the (poor) rural
areas and 7.4% in the (rich) urban areas l) A study of twenty
latifundistas in the Central Valley of Chile indicates that the
mean proportion f disposable income consumed was 83.6% and
the median 99%21 The poor could hardly save less.
Granted that inequality does not necessarily promote a
high rate of savings and growth, is it possible that greater
equality would stimulate development? I believe that it
would.
The lack of internal demand for agricultural and industrial
products, the high propensity to import, capital flight, and
the weak incentives to innovate and establish new activities
could all be ameliorated if national income were redistributed
in a more equitable fashion. In addition, greater equality
might lead to larger private savings (since the very rich
probably save less than the middle classes and prosperous
peasants), more productive investments (since the attractive-
ness of urban real estate would decline), and greater public
savings (since tax evasion would diminish and the tax base
would increase). Moreover, a redistribution of consumytion in
favour of the very poor might raise productivity, since greater
consumption of some items (e.g. food) could lead to an increase
in health, morale, physical and mental :energy and output.
Finally, in many countries, if a redistribution of income were
accompanied by a redistribution of land, agricultural output
would increase (since yields are greater on the small farms than
on the large).
1A. Bergan, "Personal Income Distribution and Personal Savings
in Pakistan, 1963/64," Pakistan Development Review, Summer
1967, p. 185.
2M. J. Sternberg, Chilean Land Tenure and Land Reform,
Ph. D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley,
September 1962, Ch. IV.
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Thus there need be no conflict between equality and develop-
ment. A redistribution of income and wealth (partiutilarly landed
wealth) could have multiple benefits. It is fatuous to suggest
that economic justice is a luxury the underdeveloped countries
cannot afford. It the last analysis, as recent events in
Pakistan demonstrate, it is inequality which is likely to be
incompatible with both political stability and development.
4) The "population explosion" nth
*Supposing redistribution did lead to a rise in
agricultural production, it would all be in vain
because population groith constantly acts to prevent
a rise in per capita incomes. But Colin Clark),
at least, argues that countries with high rate of
population growth do not in fact show significantly
lower rates of increase in real product per capita:
A frequently stated "Development Myth" is to the effect
that, while the developing countries may be making some progress
in production, this is all being eaten up by the growth in
population. This view is about on the same intellectual level
as the Cargo Cult of the Melanesian islanders, who believe
that desirable goods enter the world from some mysterious
supernatural source, and do not have to be produced by the
labours of the population. Despite its naivete, it bas been
held by many economists who, in other fields, have shown them-
selves refined and sophisticated thinkára.
It is easy enough to test it. If there is any truth in
it then, subject to some individual variations, developing
countries with comparatively low rates of population growth on a
statistical average show a higher rate of growth of real product
per head than those with higher rates of population growth.
Information to test this theorem is conveniently to hand
in National Accounts of Less Developed Countries compiled by
O.E.C.D. (Paris, 1967):
Director, Institute for Research in Agricultural Economics,
University of Oxford.
Population growth Population growth I Population growth
under 2% per year 2% to 2.9% per year 3% per year or over
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Population growth and increases in real product per head
1950-1965 in Asia, Africa and Latin America (all countries
included for which information available)
Increase in
real product
per head
% per year
Increase in
real product
per head
% per head
Increase in
real product
per head
Z per year
Algeria 1.8 Morocco -03 Kenya 1.9
Tunisia 2.2 Egypt 3.1 Rhodesia 0.9
Nigeria 1.2 Ghana 2.4 Costa Rica 0.7
Tanzania 1.2 Sudan 3-0 Dominican
Republic 2.3
Jamaica 5.1 Uganda 0 8 El Salvador 2.2
Antilles --14 -Haiti -0.7 Guatemala 1.7
Argentine L2 Panama 30 Honduras 0.5
Bolivia 01 Trinidad 5.3 Mexico 2.7
Chile L2 Nicaragua 2.7
Columbia 1.7 Brazil 2.3
Paraguay 0.8 Ecuador 1.5
Peru 2.8 Venezuela 2,7
Iraq 6.9 Israel 5.8
Burma 2.9 Syria 0.7
Ceylon 0.1 Cambodia 2.7
India 1.5 Taiwan 3.9
Pakistan 1,3 Philippines 2.1
S. Korea 4.2
Thailand 30
Average 1.4 Average 2.3 Average 2.2
